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Summary 
 The 2003/2003 outbreak of SARS pointed to the urgent need to plan and prepare appropriate response 
measures to a possible future threat. Countries and international organizations have put in considerable 
efforts to improve the current situation. 
One of the aims of work package 8, of the European commission funded research project 
‘SARSControl’, was to  carry out policy evaluation on current SARS policies and develop 
recommendations to improve preparedness and response of SARS and SARS-like diseases. 
 
To achieve this goal an evaluation study was carried out using the Hazard Analysis and Crtical Control 
Points (HACCP) methodology. The HACCP methodology, initially developed by the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration to ensure food safety, was adapted to evaluate polices on SARS response and 
management in order to develop recommendations. The first step in the process was to carry out an 
extensive literature review on the 2002/2003 SARS outbreak and identify measures, interventions and 
strategies used to control the outbreak. The following steps and  principles of the HACCP were 
applied to identify weaknesses and gaps in the managemnet of pandemic diseases like SARS. Building 
on these weaknesses and gaps recommendations were formulated. 
 
The analysis was carried out based on key policy components identified by the Centre for 
Disease Control (CDC). The application of the HACCP proved to be an effective tool to 
identify gabs and put forward policy recommendations to enable effective preparedness and 
management of a future outbreak of SARS or SARS-like disease. 
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Introduction 
 
This report is part of the research work on policy evaluation done by WP8 of the EU-funded 
SARSControl project. The aim of the work was to identify pitfalls/weaknesses in the way the 
2002/2003 SARS outbreak was managed in different countries and develop recommendations 
based on the experiences. To achieve this, a Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point 
(HACCP) methodology was applied. Key SARS policy components identified by the WHO 
were used and a literature review1 was conducted to develop flowcharts of preparedness and 
response processes. Finally recommendations were developed, suggesting possible ways to 
reduce or eliminate the hazards, thus minimizing the risk of spread of SARS in case of a 
future outbreak. 
 
The HACCP method and its application in the SARSControl policy evaluation study is put 
forth in the following chapters. Chapter 1 describes the methodology of the HACCP and its 
adaptation for the SARSControl policy evaluation. In Chapter 2, a SARSControl HACCP 
analysis is done for 4 different policy component and the results are presented.  
List of acronyms and abbreviations  
SARS:  Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
HACCP:  Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point 
CCP:  Critical Control Point  
WHO:  World Health Organisation 
EC:  European Commission   
CDC:  Centre for Disease Control (USA, Atlanta) 
ECDC: European Centre for Disease Control 
PPP:  Pandemic Preparedness Plan   
PPE:  Personal Protective Equipment 
CCM:  Community Containment Measures 
HCF:  Health Care Facilities 
HCW:  Health Care Workers 
GP:  General Practitioners 
                                                 
1
 A listing of references used to study each of the policy components is available after each paragraph.  
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The HACCP method 
Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP) is a method developed for controlling 
food production processes, by identifying possible hazards in manufacturing processes. The 
aim of this method is to identify strategies to prevent, eliminate, or reduce hazard occurrence. 
The HACCP methodology is adapted for the evaluation of benefits and threats of national 
prevention, control and response to pandemic infectious diseases (SARSControl-HACCP). 
The National Advisory Committee on Microbiological Criteria for foods has published 
HACCP application guidelines for an evaluation of food production processes [1]. These 
guidelines were reviewed and adapted for the analysis of infectious disease policies. The 
study protocol is on page 8 of this report. 
 
Structure of a HACCP 
The HACCP is divided into five main tasks. These are listed in the left hand column of the 
table below and the right hand column shows the equivalent tasks of the SARS-HACCP. 
 
HACCP-Tasks SARS-HACCP  
1. Assemble the HACCP team  
• Identify individuals with specific knowledge and 
experience – they are the HACCP-Team 
• Team has to be multidisciplinary and has to be 
assisted by experts of other disciplines which are 
related to the process 
• These experts have to verify the completeness of 
the hazard analysis  
• Team comprises of WP8 
members 
• Support and experience 
gathered from other 
SARSControl partners 
2. Describe the food and its distribution  
• Description of food (ingredients, processing, 
distribution) 
• Clear definition of SARS and 
comparable infectious diseases 
• Description of the control 
systems and the diseases they 
are applied for 
3. Describe the intended use and consumers 
of the food 
 
• Describe the normal consumers and the intended 
use of the food 
• The general population (as they 
are susceptible to infectious 
disease threats.) 
4. Develop a flow diagram that describes the 
process 
 
• Give a clear and simple overview of the steps 
involved in the process  
• Flow diagram has to cover all parts of the process 
• Make a flow diagram of all 
components involved in the 
control of SARS. Such 
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• A block diagram is sufficiently descriptive  flowcharts should be based on 
guidelines, plans, scientific 
literature and reports on SARS 
containment policies. 
5. Verify the flow diagram  
• Perform an on-site review of the operation to 
verify the accuracy of the diagram 
• Experts should comment on the 
flowcharts   
 
 
The seven HACCP principles  
The seven principles have to be accomplished to finalise a HACCP plan. The principles are 
described in the left hand column and their related aims for the SARS-HACCP are shown in 
the right hand column.  
 
Tasks Approach for the SARS-HACCP 
Conduct a hazard analysis (principle 1) 
• Develop a list of hazards reasonably likely to cause 
injury or illness if not effectively controlled 
• All related parts of the process have to be 
considered in the analysis  
• HACCP is not a quality control measurement; 
hazards are defined as limitation of safety 
• If the Hazard analysis is not done correctly the 
HACCP-plan can not be effective 
• The process of conducting a hazard analysis 
involves two stages: (i) Hazard identification (can 
be done as brainstorming session), producing a list 
of potential hazards associated with each step of 
the process – historical health threading events 
could provide information; (ii) evaluation of 
hazards, the HACCP team decides which hazards 
must be addressed in the plan, evaluate the 
Hazards on severity and likelihood of occurrence 
(public health impact of hazard), all related parts 
of the hazard have to be identified to have a clear 
picture of their influences  
• Hazards associated with each step of the process 
should be listed with possible control measures 
(not all hazards can be prevented but can be 
controlled)  
• HA (Hazard Analysis) Summary could be 
presented as: table, narrative summary of 
considerations and summary table listing hazards 
and control measures 
• These points are all important 
and have to be applied  
 
 
 
 
 
 
• (i), (ii) by e-mail contact, 
telephone conferences and  
discussions 
• Identify hazards by reviewing 
publications and other 
documentary  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Tables could be used to list 
hazards and their control 
measures 
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Determine the critical control points (CCP) (principle 2) 
• Critical Control Points (CCP) is defined as a step 
at which control can be applied and is essential to 
prevent or eliminate hazards. The potential of 
hazard must be addressed by determining a CCP 
• Complete identification of hazards is essential to 
find the CCP’s. CCP decision tree is useful tool to 
determine whether a particular step is a CCP for a 
previously identified hazard  
• CCPs are located at every step were hazards can be 
prevented, eliminated or reduced  
• Identify CCP: at which step 
could hazards be controlled, and 
prevented and eliminated 
 
• Use CCP decision tree to 
demonstrate which steps led to 
a hazard. 
 
Establish critical limits (principle 3) 
• A critical limit is a maximum or minimum value to 
which parameter must be controlled at a CCP to 
prevent, eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level 
the occurrence of a food safety hazard. A critical 
limit distinguishes between safe and unsafe 
operation. Critical limit is no operational limit!  
• The SARS related CCPs have 
with no values, because they are 
dichotomous: e.g. 
communication yes/no; identify 
case yes/no 
Establish monitoring procedures (principle 4) 
•  Evaluate whether a CCP is under control 
 
• Monitoring has three main proposes: (i) tracking of 
an operation – bring a process back intro control, 
(ii) to monitor if corrective actions have to be 
applied, (iii) documentation for use in verification. 
• Monitoring should be continuous and accurate!  
• The HACCP is used to identify 
critical points and shortcomings 
in policy processes in order to 
give recommendations. 
Monitoring of steps could be 
part of the recommendations but 
will not be applied in our 
model. 
Establish corrective actions (principle 5) 
• Develop corrective actions in advance for each 
CCP 
• Should be part of  the 
recommendations  
Establish verification procedures (principle 6) 
• Verification is applied to monitor the operability of 
an HACCP plan. It is crucial for the maintenance 
of an HACCP system.  
• To ensure that the plan is working effectively all 
hazards need to be controlled 
• Could be recommended to 
control CCP - Is not part of our 
HACCP 
Establish record-keeping and documentation procedures (principle 7) 
• Documentation of the HACCP: steps defined as 
CCP’s, hazards of concern, critical limits, 
monitoring, corrective actions 
• Documentation of the HACCP development  
• Will be include in the final 
report 
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Study protocol for the HACCP of infectious disease policies 
This chapter includes the description of the SARS-HACCP components, the evaluation of 
national and international policies for infectious disease with pandemic potential. The study 
protocol is based on the above outlined adaptation of the HACCP principles.  
 
Preliminary tasks of a HACCP 
1. Assemble the HACCP team 
Members of WP8 are conducting the HACCP. Further input could be provided by project 
partners in order to get expert input on the analysed policy components.  
 
2. Describe the content and its distribution 
The HACCP is applied to evaluate public health policies for SARS or SARS-like disease. The 
data on the related policy parts are mainly taken from recommendations published by WHO 
[1, 3] and Centre for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta/USA (CDC) [2], as well as 
from articles on the 2002/03 SARS outbreak.  
 
3. Describe the process and those affected  
The whole public is susceptible to infectious diseases; more at risk are vulnerable groups. 
 
4. Develop a flow diagram that describes the process 
The flow diagrams of international/national/local infectious disease policies are drawn using 
information from policy recommendations, publications on outbreak control activities and 
other related publications. 
A core chart will display the overall connection of all components of infectious disease 
policies (using information from the CDC-Guidelines [4]). Additional detailed policy 
flowcharts will display their functionality of the different components.  
 
5. Verify the flow diagram 
Different policy experts, e. g. members of the SARSControl project, will review the HACCP 
model.  
 
 
The seven HACCP principles  
Conduct a hazard analysis (principle 1) 
The identification of hazards associated with the policy component will be carried out. This 
could be done using publications, reviews and guideline published on infectious disease 
policies and by brainstorming processes. The severity of hazards and the likelihood of their 
occurrence have to be evaluated. Policy tasks related to the hazard need to be identified in 
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order to get a picture of the related CCPs. Possible control measures and their influence on the 
hazards need to be listed.  
 
Determine the critical control points (principle 2) 
A CCP is a step in the process where a hazard can be prevented, eliminated or reduced. A 
CCP decision tree (flowchart) will be developed in order to determine whether a particular 
step is a CCP for a previously identified hazard.  
 
Establish critical limits (principle 3) 
The specific critical limit of a CCP has to be determined. However, most parts in the policy 
process have dichotomous characters (like applied – was not applied), for which no values can 
be defined.  
 
 
The further principles - Establish monitoring procedures (principle 4); Establish corrective 
actions (principle 5); Establish verification procedures (principle 6); Establish record-keeping 
and documentation procedures (principle 7) - are not part of our analyses as they are used to 
implement a HACCP process. We apply this analysis in order to formulate recommendations 
for policy improvement. The principles 4 to 7 are used to establish monitoring and 
intervention actions for processes, which is not part of our analysis. However, principle 4 to 7 
will be the basis for recommendations which could also include ongoing monitoring process 
of control and response activities.  
 
References: 
1. National Advisory Committee on Microbiological Criteria for foods. Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point Principles 
and Application Guidelines. J Food Prot 1998; 61 (9):1246-59. 
 
2. World Health Organisation (WHO). WHO SARS Risk Assessment and Preparedness Framework. 2004: 
    http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/WHO_CDS_CSR_ARO_2004_2/en/index.html. Accessed 15 June 2007 
 
3. World Health Organisation (WHO).Alert, verification and public health management of SARS in the post- 
    outbreak period. 2003: http://www.who.int/csr/sars/postoutbreak/en/index.html. Accessed 15 June 2007 
 
 
4. Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Public Health Guidance for Community-Level  
    Preparedness and Response to Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). 2005:  
    http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/guidance/index.htm. Accessed 15 June 2007 
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SARSControl HACCP analysis 
 
In this chapter flowcharts of key policy component processes are illustrated. They have been 
developed based on literature reviews of the 2002/2003 SARS outbreak and were used in the 
identification of potential hazards in the preparedness and response evaluation of SARS 
control interventions. Based on the flowcharts a thorough process description has been 
produced for the following policy components: 
 
1. Command and control (Flowchart 1 , 2, 3) 
2. Preparedness and response in Healthcare facilities (Flowchart  4)  
3. Surveillance and laboratory diagnostics (Flowchart 5, 6)  
4. Community containment ( Flowchart 7) 
  
Please note:  
In the next section the flowcharts 1-7 will follow the description of the policy 
components and thus offer an illustrative overview of the process described. However 
the description may not follow the pattern of the flowcharts as more information has 
been retrieved since they were produced.   
 
For a more detailed reading of the flowcharts in a high resolution format please access the 
SARCControl homepage: www.sarscontrolproject.org/start.html. 
 
 
Command and Control  
Rationale:  
Command and control activities are relevant for guiding preparedness measures for pandemic 
diseases. Preparedness plans need to be formulated on different management levels and 
precautionary measures need to be applied in order to ensure effective response in case of a 
disease outbreak. It is recommended that national pandemic preparedness plans (PPP) are in 
place in each country in order to ensure strategies for disease containment in case of an 
outbreak situation.. In addition to this, the capacity of disease response activities (e.g. surge 
capacity of laboratories or hospitals) needs to be estimated in order to have data on the 
national response capacity 
Description of the process:  
International institutions, like WHO, European Commission (EC) and European Center for 
Disease Control (E-CDC) guide nations in their national preparedness planning [1,2,3]. In 
addition, preparedness plans for institutional, community and regional levels are suggested by 
WHO. Institutions like laboratories and health care facilities should prepare their own 
pandemic plan in order to have guidelines for emergency situations available [6].  
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1. Support by international institutions: 
International institutions (WHO, EC and ECDC) are supporting nations in developing their 
preparedness planning for pandemic infections, like SARS or pandemic influenza [3, 4]. 
WHO has published guidelines and a checklist for national influenza preparedness planning 
[6,] and guidelines for SARS preparedness and management [7]. In case of pandemic spread 
they will provide detailed information on disease control and co-ordinate an international 
disease response. 
 
Possible Hazards 
• Published guidelines are not used for national preparedness 
• Guidelines are not adequate to be considered by nations 
• Nations keep their pandemic preparedness activities confidential and do not participate 
on policy evaluation at a regional/international level.  
• Nations do not participate on preparedness workshops, or do not conduct national 
preparedness workshops 
• Nations do not want to discuss their current preparedness activities with external 
experts. 
• Recommendations to improve national preparedness are not considered 
• Research activities (like European framework programs) require time to produce 
applicable recommendations. 
 
Critical Control Points 
• Guidelines on national pandemic preparedness 
• Inventory of national preparedness activities 
• Support of national preparedness 
• Research on Pandemic infections 
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Recommendations for support by international institutions: 
 Overall Guidelines have to be written in a common manner, such that they can be 
adapted by all states and build an overall basis for national preparedness planning. 
 
 Inventory and the support of national preparedness have to be undertaken in a 
“diplomatic” way in order to avoid unmasking nation’s preparedness activities. Also 
the public health policy support has to be organised in a diplomatic manner, to 
ensure nation’s co-operation.  
 
 Research accomplished to improve disease response and preparedness activities have 
to be undertaken in a timely manner to assure a timely implementation of scientific 
findings 
 
2. Identify authorities and institutions responsible in disease response 
The relevant authorities in charge of pandemic response have to be identified. This might be 
organised differently among nations. Some nations co-ordinate disease response on national 
level and others will locate the decision making process on regional level (federal system). 
The communication structure among the responsible organisations and individuals has to be 
established. WHO recommends establishing a pandemic planning committee to give advice to 
the government in their disease preparedness, as well as in outbreak management [7]. 
 
Possible Hazards 
• Authorities in charge of decision making are not identified, which lead to an 
uncoordinated disease response and a delay in implementing control measures. 
• The public does not trust the national disease management, because the response 
seems uncoordinated (e.g. due to unqualified spokesperson).  
• Individuals dedicated for certain response activities are not qualified. 
• The lack of scientific advice leads to a non- “science based” unorganized and 
ineffective outbreak management. 
• The PPP is written without expert advice and thus parts are inapplicable. 
• The lack of clearly defined command structure (who has to be informed and who is 
responsible to decide about what action has to be taken, etc) leads to a delay in 
response activities 
• National epidemiological outbreak investigation teams are not prepared for an 
epidemic as they do not have sufficient capacity and equipment to carry out work.  
• No specific hospitals/units in hospitals are designated for the isolation and triage of 
SARS cases. General hospitals have to care for SARS patients which could lead to 
inappropriate treatment and lack of infection control standards. 
• A national reference laboratory which can perform the necessary laboratory tests is 
unavailable in the country, which leads to a time delay in specimen testing.  
• Arrangements with partner laboratory, to verify diagnoses (recommended by WHO 
[6]), are not contacted, which delays case confirmation. 
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• The national disease control institution is not prepared for pandemic outbreak 
surveillance with a possibly high number of cases, and institutions to assist a country 
are not identified. 
• National and regional spokespersons are not identified, which leads to inadequate 
public communication. 
 
Critical Control Points 
• Incorporate pandemic response in existing national public health structures for 
pandemic preparedness and response [7], as these systems have proved to be 
functional. 
• Ensure that a staff pool to undertake community containment measures and to 
maintain essential public services is well trained and available for a possible epidemic. 
Alternative staff should be identified on demand in order to enhance the response 
capacity.  
• Health care facilities appropriate for the treatment of infectious cases have to be 
identified. They should have sufficient isolation capacity available and personal 
protective equipment (PPE) need to be stockpiled. 
• Agreements with national laboratory and laboratories of the “Multi-centre 
Collaborative Network” [7] should be made in order to undertake SARS diagnostic 
procedures according to the WHO guidelines [11]. 
• National and regional outbreak investigation teams should be available to undertake 
research on the origin and progression of an epidemic.  
• Establish a Pandemic planning committee, to get expert advice on the outbreak 
management to ensure “science based” planning and response [7].  
• Arrange co-operations with neighbouring countries in order to get or offer support if 
being overwhelmed by a pandemic outbreak.  
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3. Develop national pandemic preparedness plans and guidelines for relevant 
respond activities 
Guidelines give instructions for standard procedures in critical situations. Therefore, 
guidelines should be available for the relevant outbreak management tasks. The general 
guideline for national pandemic policies is the PPP. WHO, EC and the ECDC are supporting 
nations in their effort to develop PPPs [3, 4]. Such plans should address the relevant 
components of pandemic preparedness and response. Countries with a federal response 
structure need to publish regional plans in addition to the national PPP. 
 
Possible Hazards 
• Components of the PPP are not applicable and can not be implemented. 
• Guidelines for the treatment of SARS cases outside dedicated SARS wards are not in 
place. Large  amount of patients can not be treated adequately and in a safe manner 
Recommendations for identification of responsible authorities and institutions: 
 Use of existing national public health structures for pandemic preparedness and 
response, because these systems are proved already operative. Incorporate pandemic 
response in these structures [7].  
 
 Make sure that a staff pool, to undertake community containment measures and to 
maintain essential public services, is available and well trained for a possible 
epidemic. Alternative staff should be identified on demand in order to enhance the 
response capacity.  
 
 Health care facilities appropriate for the treatment of infectious cases have to be 
identified. They should have sufficient isolation capacity available and personal 
protective equipment (PPE) need to be stockpiled. 
 
 Agreements with national laboratory and laboratories of the “Multi-centre 
Collaborative Network” [7] should be made in order to undertake SARS diagnostic 
procedures according to the WHO guidelines [11]. 
 
 National and regional outbreak investigation teams should be available to undertake 
research on the origin and progression of an epidemic.  
 
 Establish a Pandemic planning committee, to get expert advice on the outbreak 
management to ensure “science based” planning and response [7].  
 
 Arrange co-operation with neighbouring countries in order to get or offer support if 
being overwhelmed by a pandemic outbreak.  
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• Legal issues to put containment measures into practice are not considered which lead 
to conflict with national law. 
• Ethical issues of outbreak management are not addressed, leading to a lack of public 
acceptance of outbreak management 
• Communication to exchange information with international institutions and further 
countries is not organised. 
• Communication among different national hierarchical levels is not organised.  
• Communication to the public is not organised. 
• The role of media is not considered in the PPP. 
 
Critical Control Points 
• Components of PPPs 
• Treatment in non dedicated SARS facilities 
• Legal issues 
• Ethical issues 
• Communication 
 
Recommendations for national pandemic plans and guidelines: 
 Ensure that authorities on all policy levels are involved in pandemic planning and 
that they co-operate in applying the recommendations.  
 
 The founding of response activities should be considered in pandemic planning. 
 
 Write the PPP with relevant experts. Get advice from experts of various public health 
fields in order to ensure that different public health opinions are considered in the 
plan. 
 
 Establish guidelines on how to act if standard treatment situations (SARS ward) are 
not available.  
 
 Establish guidelines on how to act if capacities of services are overwhelmed. 
 
 Identify quick and effective communication methods among all relevant institutions, 
levels and the public. 
 
 Identify appropriate spokesperson(s) on national and regional level in order to 
maintain public’s trust. 
 
 Consider legal, ethical and financial issues in the PPP.   
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4. Estimate impact of a pandemic on outbreak management, health care and 
other essential services (identify surge capacity): 
In order to plan outbreak management, the impact of a possible pandemic has to be estimated. 
The capacities of institutions involved in the outbreak response, like labs and health care 
facilities, have to address the needs caused by a pandemic. Arrangements with neighbouring 
countries could be made to compensate nation’s restricted capacities. 
 
Possible Hazards 
• Modelling analyses are lacking, inadequate or not updated; therefore a wrong 
assumption of pandemic impact on public health services is made 
• Clinics appropriate for the treatment of SARS patients are not identified in a sufficient 
number.  
• Medical ventilator/respirators or personnel protective equipment (PPE) are not stored 
to a necessary degree, which leads to a shortage in supply. 
• Laboratory for the diagnoses of SARS are not able to analyse a high number of 
cultures, which lead to a delay in testing procedures and case confirmation. 
• Implementing Community Containment Measures (CCMs) (like managing mass 
gatherings) requires a large number of trained staff. Such personnel need to be 
identified and trained ahead of an epidemic.  
• Financial resources are not secured, which leads to a delay in recruiting staff and the 
application of intervention measures during an outbreak 
• Disease surveillance in outbreak situations could be overwhelmed in: 
a. Inappropriate way of case reporting (e.g. by fax is not suitable to manage a large 
number of cases)  
b. Data management programmes/software used is incompetent (not adequate to 
handle large datasets). 
 
Critical Control Points 
• Estimate the impact of an epidemic 
• Infection control strategies at clinics and hospitals 
• Laboratory capacity  
• Community Containment Measures (CCM) 
• Surveillance  
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Recommendations for the identification of surge capacity of healthcare system 
and essential services: 
 Conduct national epidemic modelling analysis regularly to have updated data of 
the situation. Such analyses should be the basis to identify the outbreak impact 
on the health system in order to plan necessary response activities.  
 
 Define alternative treatment options (like mobile triage facilities) in case SARS 
wards are overcrowded.  
 
 Arrange agreements with laboratories (neighbouring countries) if high number of 
samples need to be tested.  
 
 Update PPP regularly to address political and social changes. 
 
 Surveillance data should be computer based, in order to ensure fast and easy 
analysis.  
 
 Legal and financial issues of outbreak response have to be planned in 
beforehand. 
 
5. Institutional pandemic preparedness planning 
Institutions like health care facilities need their own pandemic plans addressing the specific 
institutional requirement and stating their tasks during a pandemic. These plans should 
include components like identification of responsibilities, communication ways and standards 
for various procedures like isolation and infection control measures. 
 
 
Possible Hazards 
• The plan does not include necessary components, which leads to a lack of needed 
guidelines. 
• Individuals in charge are not suitable to manage the tasks allocated to them.  
• Not all staff follows the plan, because they do not accept the guidelines. 
• No staff pool for outbreak response is available to address the need caused by an 
outbreak. 
 
Critical Control Points 
• Identifying stakeholders 
• Components of the plan 
• Acceptance 
• Staff pool 
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Recommendations for institutional pandemic preparedness planning: 
 Ensure that the all institutions involved in outbreak response accept the preparedness 
planning so that outbreak containment can be immediately applied if needed. 
 
 Identify reserve staff which could support the hospital during a pandemic 
 
 Guide the institutions in the pandemic planning to ensure well functioning plans. 
 
Summary of recommendations for command and control 
The main results of the HACCP analysis of command and control point on to the need for a 
clear and smoothly functioning management structure to ensure an effective cooperation and 
coordination among organizations to prepare and respond to a pandemic outbreak. It is hence 
necessary to have plans and guidelines written in a common manner. Research activities need 
to be undertaken jointly and scientific findings need to be disseminated and implemented as 
soon as possible. Agreements with neighboring countries on support during a pandemic 
should be made. Arrangements with national and international reference laboratories should 
be made. It is important to identify authorities/institutions and clearly define their roles in the 
preparedness planning and response to a pandemic. A pandemic planning committee should 
be established to provide expert guidance on planning and response activities and plans 
should be made involving local institutions. Healthcare systems and other services should be 
evaluated to ensure that they will not be overwhelmed during an outbreak. 
 
References:  
1 World Health Organisation (WHO). Influenza. WHO 2006.  
 Url: http://www.who.int/csr/disease/influenza/en/. Accessed 15 June 2007  
 
2.  World Health Organisation (WHO). Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS).  WHO 2004.  
 Url: http://www.who.int/csr/sars/en/ . Accessed 15 June 2007 
  
3. Ciotti M, Karcher F, Ganter B, Tüll P. Results of survey of national influenza pandemic preparedness in Europe. 
Eurosurveillance 2005; 10 (3): 050303  
 
4. Horstick O, Kaiser R, Ciotti M, Brown C, Coulombier D, et al. Europe makes progress in preparing for influenza 
pandemic, but further work needed. Eurosurveillance 2005; 10 (11): 051117 
 
5. European Commission (EC). Generic Preparedness Planning. EC 2005.  
 Url.: http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_threats/com/preparedness/preparedness_en.htm#2  . Accessed 15 June 2007 
 
6. World Health Organisation (WHO). WHO global influenza preparedness plan -The role of WHO and 
recommendations for national measures before and during pandemics. WHO 2005.  
 Url: http://www.who.int/entity/csr/resources/publications/influenza/GIP_2005_5Eweb.pdf . Accessed 15 June 2007 
   
7. World Health Organisation (WHO). WHO checklist for influenza pandemic preparedness planning. WHO 2005.  
 Url: http://www.who.int/entity/csr/resources/publications/influenza/FluCheck6web.pdf . Accessed 15 June 2007 
 
8. World Health Organisation (WHO). Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) - WHO 
guidelines/recommendations/descriptions. WHO 2004.  
 Url:http://www.who.int/csr/sars/guidelines/en/index.html . Accessed 15 June 2007 
 
9. European Commission (EC). Influenza pandemic preparedness. EC 2005.  
SARSControl project/WP8/L Hjarnø, AM Syed, R Krumkamp, R Reintjes, AR Aro. 
 
 19 
 Url: http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_threats/com/Influenza/influenza_level_en.htm. Accessed 15 June 2007 
 
10. European Commission (EC). Communication on generic preparedness planning for public health threats. EC 2005. 
Url: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2005/com2005_0605en01.pdf.  Accessed 15 June 2007 
11. World Health Organisation (WHO). WHO SARS International Reference and Verification Laboratory Network: 
Policy and Procedures in the Inter-Epidemic Period. WHO 2004. 
 Url: http://www.who.int/csr/sars/guidelines/en/WHOSARSReferenceLab.pdf. Accessed 15 June 2007 
 
12 World Health Organisation (WHO). Multi-centre Collaborative Network: Laboratories testing for SARS. WHO 2003. 
Url: http://www.who.int/csr/sars/testing/en/. Accessed 15 June 2007 
 
13       World Health Organisation (WHO). Production of pilot lots of inactivated influenza vaccines from 
            reassortants derived from avian influenza viruses. Interim biosafety assessment WHO 2003. 
Url:http://www.who.int/entity/csr/resources/publications/influenza/FluCheck6web.pdf. Accessed 15 June 2007
SARSControl project/WP8/L Hjarnø, AM Syed, R Krumkamp, R Reintjes, AR Aro. 
 
 20 
 
Flowchart 1 
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Flowchart 3 
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Preparedness and response planning in health care facilities 
Rationale 
In the 2002/03 SARS outbreak, nosocomial spread in Healthcare facilities (HCFs) were the most 
common source of transmission in the affected countries [1, 2]. Preparedness and response 
planning in HCF is thus needed to ensure rapid and effective treatment and infection control 
practices in case of a new pandemic outbreak. The aim of preparedness and response planning in 
HCF is to give information about diagnosing and isolation procedures for potential/suspected 
and confirmed SARS cases, about implementation of effective infection control measures and 
about communication strategies within the HCF as well as between the HCF and the 
local/regional/national public health department. The aim of preparedness and response planning 
in HCF is to ensure that standardized control actions can be rapidly implemented. 
Description of the process: 
 The National pandemic planning committee designates outbreak hospitals, at which treatment 
can be provided in case of a pandemic outbreak.  Identification of outbreak hospitals needs to be 
done in collaboration with the hospital management. Each outbreak hospital appoints a 
multidisciplinary preparedness planning committee to ensure that plans can be rapidly 
implemented. Early detection and isolation of confirmed or probable/suspected SARS patients is 
important to prevent nosocomial spread, especially as currently no methods are available for fast 
diagnosis [5]. Studies show that SARS transmission measures designed to control respiratory 
droplets and secretions along with hand hygiene would offer significant protection to other 
patients and HCWs who have contact with cases [2]. Experiences from the Tan Tock Seng 
Hospital (TTSH) in Singapore showed that the main difficulties in containing the 2002/03 SARS 
outbreak were: 
(i) late recognition of cases,  
(ii) lack of knowledge about the disease, 
(iii) inadequate infrastructure for supporting outbreak management, 
(iv) lack of procedures to identify atypical cases and 
(v) threat caused by super spreaders [3].  
 
Transmission of SARS corona virus (SARS-CoV) in HCF was a key factor in the spread of 
SARS during the 2002/03 pandemic outbreak[2]. HCWs accounted for 25% of the cases in Hong 
Kong ,65% in Canada and hospital transmissions accounted for 72% of all cases in Toronto and 
55% in Taiwan [2]. The CDC recommended the establishment of a multidisciplinary planning 
committee for each HCF in order to build up a planning and response structure. Representatives 
of this committee should be from the administration level, infection control level, public 
relations and materials management. The healthcare facility should designate a ‘SARS 
coordinator’ to lead pandemic preparedness planning and organize outbreak response activities 
[2]. In order to ensure effective communication between the HCF and the public health 
department, planning should be done in collaboration the public health department [2]. 
 
In the response to a SARS outbreak, the CDC-Atlanta has recommended HCFs to develop a 
SARS preparedness and response plan that focuses on the following components [1]: 
• Surveillance and triage 
• Clinical evaluation 
• Infection control and respiratory Hygiene 
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• Patient Isolation and Cohorting 
• Engineering and Environmental Control 
• Exposure Reporting and Evaluation 
• Staffing Needs and Personnel Policies 
• Hospital Access Controls 
• Supplies and Equipments 
• Communication and Reporting/Public relations department 
 
The capacity of the facility to respond to SARS should be assessed using simulation models [1]. 
1. Surveillance and Triage  
Surveillance refers to systematic monitoring of diseases in a population, in order to detect cases 
as soon as possible and to have case data available for implementing control actions. Triage aims 
at categorising potential SARS patients according to their disease symptoms at specific triage 
wards in order to decide about the further treatment procedure [1, 2, 4, 5, 6]. 
Possible Hazards 
• Unrecognized SARS patients might infect “healthy” patients/visitors/HCW during 
hospitalization or GP consultation.  
• Monitoring is insufficient and undetected cases can spread the disease   
 
Critical Control Points 
• Special entrance ways/triage/ward for patients with specific symptoms. 
• Educating the GP/ physicians in correct case definition/diagnosis. 
• Registration and monitoring of patients, health care workers and visitors with SARS-like 
symptoms (hospital logs).
 
Recommendations for surveillance and triage: 
 Development of a preparedness and response plan for each hospital/GP clinic/center.  
 Distribution of consultation guidelines and triage procedures in case of a suspected 
SARS patient.  
 Training of medical staff in use of PPE, hand hygiene, respiratory etiquette. 
 Establish procedures within each HCF to monitor risk groups like staff, patients and 
visitors to enforce early detection of new cases of SARS.  
 Develop guidelines and train staff on triage screening of patients in case of a SARS 
outbreak in order to use limited resources appropriately. 
 
2. Clinical evaluation of symptomatic persons 
Clinical recognition of SARS refers to a combination of clinical and epidemiological features in 
order to distinguish SARS from other respiratory diseases [5]. 
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Possible Hazards 
• The patient is not diagnosed correctly and is not transferred to an isolation ward 
• No appropriate diagnostic tests are available, which leads to late case identification or 
misdiagnoses. 
Critical Control Points 
• Establish procedures within each HCF to ensure access to  relevant information 
(diagnoses, treatment, research)  
 
Recommendations for clinical evaluation of symptomatic persons 
 Establish procedures within each HCF and clinic to ensure correct and updated case 
definition/diagnosis 
 Identify SARS hospitals, with appropriate diagnostic supplies.  
 
3. Infection Control and Respiratory Hygiene 
These activities aim at preventing nosocomial infection and SARS transmission from inpatients, 
healthcare workers to their contacts. Hospital infection control measures are e.g. enhanced hand 
hygiene and use of personal protective equipment (PPE) [1, 2, 3, 5]. 
Possible Hazards 
• Transmission from HC personnel working on different wards or in different hospital 
settings  
• PPE is not stockpiled and the resources are limited 
 
Critical Control Points 
• Infection control measures (Use of PPE, hand hygiene, respiratory etiquette)  
• Designate specific SARS hospitals for treatment in case of an outbreak, with appropriate 
diagnostic supplies  
SARSControl project/WP8/L Hjarnø, AM Syed, R Krumkamp, R Reintjes, AR Aro. 
 
 26 
Recommendations for infection control and respiratory hygiene: 
 Provide clear guidelines about how to apply infection control measures, including proper 
use of PPE (masks or respirators, gloves, gowns and eye protection). 
 
 
4. Patient isolation wards  
The aim of isolation wards is separating groups of patients with similar symptoms from the other 
patients in a hospital, in order to prevent disease transmission [1, 4]. 
Possible Hazards 
• Transfer of SARS patients from one ward to another might increases the likelihood of 
infection of other patients and HCW 
• Insufficient isolation wards causing cross infection patients and HCW in HCFs 
 
Critical Control Points 
• Minimize risk of infection during transport of SARS patient; Infection control measures 
(Use of PPE, hand hygiene, respiratory etiquette ) 
• Isolation units at designated SARS hospitals  
 
 
5. Engineering and Environment Control 
These measures refer to the optimal functioning of the HCF by estimating and preparing for the 
necessary capacity of rooms and units in case of a pandemic event. 
Possible Hazards 
• Spread of infection within the healthcare facility 
Critical Control Points 
• SARS treatment units 
 
Recommendations for patient isolation wards: 
 Identify specific SARS wards and paths separated from other hospital traffic to minimize 
the risk of transmission to patients, visitors, and staff. 
 Develop guidelines for the isolation procedures and placement concerning: Triage 
wards, SARS evaluation clinics (fever clinics) and case diagnosis 
 Development of strategies at HCFs to quickly implement appropriate isolation 
procedures, separating the suspected cases from the other patients. 
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Recommendations for engineering and environment control: 
 Improve the capacity of the facility to isolate SARS patients in designated Infection 
Control Units (IFU).  
 Install infection isolation rooms (AIIRs) 
 Develop guidelines about how an AIIRs will be modified if required 
 
6. Exposure Reporting and Evaluation 
Informing authorities in case of suspected exposure (patients + HCW) 
Possible Hazards 
• Late identification of cases in the HCF (which can lead to possible disease 
transmission) 
Critical Control Points 
• Exposure report 
 
 
7. Health care personnel: 
During an outbreak existing staff shortages may be amplified by enhanced need of HCW. 
 
Possible Hazards 
• Lack of extra staff to support the hospital in a crises situation 
 
Critical Control Points 
• Staff recruitment   
 
Recommendations for exposure reporting and evaluation 
 Healthcare facilities should develop an exposure reporting procedure of all suspected and 
confirmed SARS cases  
 
 Develop strategies for regular communication with the public health department in order to 
share information about possible case contacts 
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Recommendations for healthcare personnel 
 Develop staff recruitment plans (e.g. retired staff) to ensure the estimated need of staff 
required to manage a SARS outbreak. 
 
 Ensure regular training in good infection control practices e.g. use of PPE, hand hygiene and 
respiratory etiquette. 
 
 
8. Hospital access control  
The aim is to limit the access to HCFs in order to reduce the number of unprotected contacts in 
case of an outbreak. 
 
 
Possible Hazards 
• Unrecognized SARS patients might infect “healthy” patients/visitors/HCW during 
hospitalization/consultation 
 
Critical Control Points 
• Access control – symptom screening 
 
Recommendations for hospital access control: 
 HCF should develop criteria and plans for limiting access to the healthcare facility 
 
 Develop guidelines for visitors and supplementary staff at the designated SARS HCF to 
self-monitor for SARS symptoms and information on health advice seeking. 
 
 
9. Supplies and equipment: 
Refers to the availability/stock piling of PPE and other essential equipment/services during an 
outbreak. 
 
Possible Hazards 
• Insufficient amount of PPE is stockpiled according to estimated need.   
 
Critical Control Points 
• Develop strategies to estimate the need of extra equipment and services in case of an 
outbreak.   
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Recommendations for supplies and equipments: 
 The HCF should determine the availability of supplies and equipment and maintain an 
appropriate stock of PPE. 
 
 Public health departments should monitor the availability of PPEs. In crisis situation 
allocation of material could be organised using this data.  
 
 Develop specific agreements with providers of essential services to ensure delivery during 
an outbreak.    
 
 
10. Communication and case reporting: 
During an outbreak it is important to report the status of patients and SARS transmission in HCF 
to the health department. In addition, media statements should be provided. 
 
Possible Hazards 
• Incorrect information is published in the media causing panic and distress in the 
community 
 
Critical Control Points 
• Appoint a responsible communication coordinator in charge of hospital statements, to 
ensure reliability. 
 
Recommendations on communication and case reporting: 
 The HCF should develop case reports and communication strategies  
 A hospital spokesperson should be identified and trained in risk communication 
 
Summary of recommendations for preparedness and response planning in HCF 
The main results of the HACCP analysis of preparedness and response planning in healthcare 
facilities point to the need for prompt and decisive use of control measures in healthcare facilities 
in order to prevent infection among HCWs and also further spread into the community. To 
enable this, HCFs should establish surveillance activities, train medical personnel on clinical 
evaluation of patients, hygiene, and proper use of PPE and triage procedures. HCFs should also 
have facilities and units designated to isolated infected patients. Essential equipment such as 
PPE, respirators etc should be stockpiled. Access to hospitals should be controlled to prevent the 
spread of infection into and from the community. Strategies on communication and case 
reporting should be developed.  
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Surveillance and Laboratory diagnostics 
Rationale 
Modelling analyses of SARS and pandemic influenza outbreaks show that intervention measures 
have to be applied in a timely manner, in order to avoid large scale transmission chains (1,2,3) 
This makes disease surveillance a key component of pandemic outbreak management, because it 
is aiming on fast and complete detection of cases. Surveillance consists of correct data 
management, analyses and their interpretation, as well as the dissemination of these results to 
relevant organisations (4). Laboratory diagnostics is closely connected with surveillance, 
because laboratory testing of the disease is needed to confirm or verify cases. To support 
surveillance with interpretable data, the proper application of standard diagnostic tests is 
important. Furthermore, handling and transportation of specimens are critical parts in the 
laboratory process. Two infections after the 2002/03 SARS outbreak were linked with laboratory 
setting (5,6), which underlines the need for laboratory safety. 
 
Description of the process 
Probable SARS cases can be identified by different ways: general practitioners (GP), hospitals, 
monitoring of vulnerable groups (e.g. HCW) or by tracing of SARS contacts. Specimen samples 
of possible infected individuals are analysed using a three-tier process. A local laboratory whose 
results indicate a positive SARS-CoV infection will send the specimens to the national reference 
laboratory for confirmation and further investigation. In case of a positive test result by the 
national reference laboratory (preliminary positive) further analyses by the European verification 
network laboratory are requested to confirm these findings (7, 8, 9, 10). Information on place and 
time of infection, the laboratory data and data on case behaviour are used to analyse the outbreak 
progression. Usually, these data are collected and analysed by local public health office staff. 
Surveillance has to be as complete and timely as possible in order to apply control actions in a 
fast manner. Surveillance is connected with different outbreak management components and 
builds the basis to consider suitable outbreak control actions.  
 
1. GP consultation & hospitalisation 
An infected individual who has respiratory symptoms consults a GP/emergency room at a 
hospital and is admitted. A possible SARS case has to be reported to the local public health 
department (11). 
 
Possible Hazards 
• The GP does not consider SARS in the diagnosis and therefore no laboratory test is 
carried out. 
• The GP misdiagnosis a case and request a laboratory test for respiratory diseases unlikely 
to be SARS, resulting in the decrease of laboratory capacity and causing unnecessary 
utilization of test material and expense. 
• Possible SARS cases are not reported to the local public health office leading to further 
potential cases. 
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Critical Control Points 
• First diagnoses 
• Report of possible SARS cases 
 
Recommendations for GP consultation & hospitalization: 
 Provide clear guidelines to the public on how to behave in case of symptom onset 
  
 Ensure that GPs use updated case definitions for diagnosis of potential cases to be 
considered of laboratory testing/Ways to inform GPs of updated case definitions 
should be put in place.   
 
 Provide guidance for GPs and HCFs for their work during the pandemic period, to 
assist the handling of possible cases. 
 
 During pandemic spread, atypical pneumonia cases should be reported to the local 
public health office as they could be possibly infected with SARS. 
 
 
2. Taking specimen samples and shipment of specimen culture 
Samples from infected individuals are taken for laboratory testing. Respiratory, stool as well as 
plasma or serum specimens are recommended to be taken from possible SARS cases (6). In case 
no qualified testing laboratory is available, the cultures need to be forwarded in a safe manner to 
a reference laboratory. Appropriate laboratories are biosafety facilities (level 3) with RT-PCR 
(reverse transcriptase-polymerase chain reaction) technology. The European laboratory network 
assists countries that do not have their own testing facilities (9). To avoid contamination during 
transportation, specimens need to be transported in a safe manner (7). 
 
Possible Hazards 
• HCW could become infected by handling specimens. 
• Samples can not be tested as they were taken in an inappropriate manner.   
• The specimen culture is not shipped in an appropriate way and contaminated material is 
discharged. 
• Modes of transport used are time consuming hence extending the time for case 
confirmation. 
 
Critical Control Points 
• Sample taking  
• Sample shipment 
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Recommendations on taking specimen samples and shipment of specimen 
culture: 
• HCWs that have contact with possible SARS cases, or with infected material, need 
(i) strict guidelines for the handing of specimens, (ii) appropriate PPE’s and (iii) 
need to be well trained and educated to handle contaminated material. 
 
• Guidelines and appropriate material/equipment for the shipment of samples have to 
be available (13) 
 
 
 
3. Laboratory Testing 
During the non-epidemic-period specimens are commonly tested by a local laboratory. If a 
SARS-CoV infection is suspected, the specimens are sent to a national reference laboratory or, in 
case no laboratory exists, specimens are tested in cooperation with a laboratory of a 
neighbouring country (12). 
Possible Hazards 
• Due to lack of safety standards laboratory staff could become infected. This especially 
matters during the non-endemic period because staff is unaware of a possible threat of an 
infectious disease like SARS. 
• The reference laboratory has less capacity and is overwhelmed by the ordered sample 
tests and no alternative laboratory is identified 
• The tests are done incorrectly, which has an impact on the sensitivity and specificity of 
results.  
• Specimens are handled in an unsafe manner and laboratory staff may become infected. 
 
Critical Control Points 
• Local lab 
• National reference lab 
• Testing procedure 
 
Recommendations on laboratory testing: 
 Recommend high safety standards for the diagnoses of possible infective specimens 
generally.  
 
 Consider laboratories for the diagnoses of SARS and designate alternative laboratory 
for an outbreak situation. Make sure that safety recommendations are considered in the 
diagnosing laboratory and for the shipment of specimens.  
 
 Use only biosafety 3 laboratory for the analyses of possible SARS specimens.  
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4. Report of preliminary test result 
The preliminary test results are reported to the facility where the case is hospitalized in order to 
assure appropriate treatment and isolation (12). Preliminary positive cases need to be reported to 
the national infections disease control institution. They need the data for their surveillance 
activities and to forward them to the relevant disease response institutions, like local public 
health offices as well as WHO and ECDC (12,4). 
 
Possible Hazards 
• Cases are reported late or incomplete and the data will be late or unavailable for the 
disease surveillance.  
• Cases are reported late to WHO / ECDC. These data will be late or unavailable for 
international disease surveillance. 
 
Critical Control Points 
• Reporting preliminary positive cases to local / national public health office 
• Report preliminary cases to WHO / ECDC 
 
Recommendations on report of preliminary test result: 
 Make sure that reporting algorithms are available and followed. Cases need to be reported 
as soon as possible to all relevant institutions to assure a complete and actual picture of the 
current disease situation. This is relevant for each level, regional, national and 
international.  
 
 
5. Verification of positive results 
WHO recommends verifying positive results by a reference lab outside the country (12). If a 
positive result is confirmed, a case is considered to be “confirmed positive”. The health care 
facilities, the national infectious disease control department as well as international organization 
need to be informed. 
Possible Hazards 
• Due to lack of safety standards lab staff could become infected. This especially matters 
during the non-endemic period because staff is unaware of a possible threat of an 
infectious disease like SARS. 
• The reference laboratory has less capacity and is overwhelmed by the ordered sample 
tests and no alternative laboratory is identified 
• The tests are done incorrectly, which has an impact on the sensitivity and specificity of 
results.  
• Cases are reported lately or incomplete. These data will be late or not available for the 
disease surveillance.  
• Cases are reported late to WHO / ECDC. These data will be late or not available for 
international disease surveillance. 
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Critical Control Points 
• Sample shipment 
• Laboratory diagnostics  
• Result report 
 
Recommendations for the verification of positive results: 
 A safety shipment of the specimens is needed to avoid contamination.  
 
 Correct interpretation of laboratory findings as defined by WHO is needed to secure high 
sensitivity and specificity (5). Current scientific evidence in laboratory diagnostics has to 
be applied for accurate results.  
 
 As described in point 3 and 4, quick shipment, diagnoses and a timely dissemination of 
results are essential for timely disease surveillance. 
 
6. Data transfer and management 
Laboratory data should be reported quickly to the relevant institutions. Data on epidemiological 
confirmed cases need to be reported as well in order to get information on possible cases. This 
data need to be managed, analysed and the results forwarded to the relevant institutions, like 
regional and national public health departments and international institutions like WHO and 
ECDC [16, 17, 18]. 
 
Possible Hazards 
• Data reporting procedures are too complicated which influences reporting speed and 
completeness of data [16].  
• Laboratory / GPs / Hospitals report cases late, thus surveillance data is not up-to-date. 
• Used computer programs are not appropriate to work with huge datasets (like in case of a 
pandemic), thus analysis of extensive outbreaks overwhelms data management capacity. 
• Secondary case data, e.g. on case contacts, is collected inappropriately and do not provide 
the necessary information.  
• Datasets can not be matched.  
• Data set are inappropriate for the surveillance of SARS cases.  
• Data reporting among the public health offices on different levels is organised 
bureaucratically, which leads to a delay in data exchange. Loss of data could be a caused 
due to complex data handling. 
• No legal basis to report data to WHO or ECDC exist, thus data are not available for 
international surveillance. 
• Data exchange is organised bureaucratically, which leads to a delay. 
 
Critical Control Points 
• Data reporting: laboratory/GP/hospital 
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• Data collection and analyses 
• Data report: local / regional public health office 
• Data report: to ECDC and WHO 
 
Recommendations for data transfer and management 
 Have reporting standards available for SARS or SARS-like diseases, which is 
applicable for each laboratory. 
 During endemic spread apply active data collection. 
 Use easy data management between the national public health offices (computer 
based). 
 Generally, use data management programs that are appropriate to manage huge 
datasets. 
 
7. Dissemination of results 
Dissemination of laboratory results 
 
Possible Hazards 
• Results are not forwarded to the relevant authorities, thus relevant institutions are not 
aware about the extent of the outbreak. 
 
Critical Control Points 
• Forward results to public health authorities 
 
Recommendations for dissemination of laboratory results 
 Communication ways clearly structured and applicable in a quick manner in order to 
disseminate surveillance data fast to the relevant authorities. 
 
Summary of recommendations for Surveillance and Laboratory diagnostics 
The main results of the HACCP analysis of surveillance and laboratory diagnostics concern the 
need for guidelines ensuring updated information of case definitions for GPs, guidelines on 
precautionary behavior/actions to be taken by the public, and guidelines and education programs 
targeted for health care workers (HCW) on PPE and handling of specimens/contaminated 
material. The need to appoint specific biosafety 3 labs for SARS-testing in case of an outbreak 
and develop reporting procedures for timely dissemination of results to relevant institutions.              
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Flowchart 5 
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Community containment measures 
 
Rationale  
Community containment measures are necessary actions in preventing and controlling infectious 
diseases like SARS and influenza. Measures to prevent/control person-to-person spread of 
diseases include monitoring, quarantine, isolation and contact tracing. These are all basic 
infectious disease control measures that proved to be critically important for the control of SARS 
in 2003 [1, 2, 3, 4, 5].  
 
Description of the process 
Potential SARS cases are reported by the diagnosing laboratories at e.g. designated SARS 
hospitals to the national/regional/local Disease Control institutions (different from country to 
country), who initiate a case investigation, monitoring and contact tracing [1, 2, 3, 6]. 
Identification of persons exposed to confirmed or probable SARS cases is done by contact 
tracing, defined by the CDC as: “Identification and location of persons who may have been 
exposed to a person with SARS CoV infection; may result in regular monitoring for evidence of 
illness and strict or modified quarantine” [6, pp.2 ].  
Identification of contacts is done by face to face- or telephone interviews with the patient and 
his/hers family members (based on structured questionnaires) [1, 2, 3, 4]. Depending on the 
health status of the contacts, they will be offered health advice/education, put under medical 
surveillance or referred to relevant hospital for treatment and isolation. Close contacts -  defined 
by the WHO, as persons: “having cared for, lived with, or had direct contact with respiratory 
secretions or body fluids of a suspect or probable case of SARS” [5], - will be quarantined for 10 
(Hong Kong, Singapore, Canada) to 14 days (China) after last exposure with a confirmed case. 
In some countries (Hong Kong, China (Beijing) and Singapore) quarantined persons were not 
allowed to leave the site of quarantine as per law. Contacts were not allowed to go out of the 
house without permission of the health officer (active monitoring with activity restrictions) 
enforcement and surveillance officers regularly monitored contacts [3, 8]. In Singapore a person 
with a home quarantine order (HQO) was offered a choice of place of quarantine,-home or at a 
special prepared quarantine centre [3]. In Hong Kong close contacts were quarantined at home 
[9]. In the UK contacts of confirmed cases are subjected to voluntary quarantine and monitored 
by health protection teams for 10 days after last exposure to the confirmed case [6]. Social 
contacts are given advice to contact authorities in case they develop symptoms (passive 
monitoring). Apart from contact tracing and quarantine other strategies, such as measures to 
decrease social interactions e.g. by closing of schools and businesses were conducted. Also 
management of people on travel to and from affected areas is regarded as an important measure 
in the prevention and control of SARS. Examples of travel measures are travel and health advice 
and visa restrictions for individuals from affected areas.     
 
1. Interview of confirmed/suspected SARS case 
A confirmed or suspected SARS patient is interviewed in order to identify and monitor every 
close contact the patient has had during the past 10 days. This procedure is done in order to 
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prevent further spread by control measures like monitoring, isolating and/or quarantine of 
contacts for the period of incubation [1, 2, 3, 8]. 
 
Possible Hazards 
• Not all close contacts can be identified and might develop symptoms in the community 
with a chance of spreading the disease 
 
• Case does not give out information/remember all the contacts he/she has had in the last 
10 days, especially when suffering from strong disease symptoms. 
 
Critical Control Points 
• As part of the epidemiological investigation: interview family and relatives of the case 
using structured questionnaires. 
 
• Review of patient or visitor logs from the hospital. 
 
Recommendations for interview of confirmed/suspected SARS case: 
 Guidelines for conducting structured interviews with confirmed and suspected 
SARS cases – questions should be framed to obtain information on: 
o Recent travel history (within the last 10 days) to suspected or confirmed 
source areas/countries  
o Close contact with travel history to suspected or confirmed source 
areas/countries. 
o Health status of close contacts for symptoms suggestive to SARS.  
o Employment in an occupation with an increased risk for SARS-CoV 
exposure, including e.g. exposed health care worker or laboratory staff. 
 
 Interview of family members and close relatives in order to confirm the information 
provided by the cases. 
 
 Review of patient journal, visitor log and employee schedules in institutions where 
SARS transmission occurs. 
 
 
2. Identify contacts/Contact Tracing 
Identification, location and evaluation of close contacts of confirmed and suspected SARS cases 
[1, 2, 4, 5, 8]. 
 
Possible Hazards 
• Identified contact refuse to collaborate    
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• The risk of being infected with SARS as an identified contact shows symptoms and is 
admitted to designated  SARS hospital for medical evaluation  
• Stigmatization of identified close contacts 
 
Critical Control Points 
• Compulsory medical evaluation of identified close contacts 
• PPE and Hygiene guidelines 
• Risk communication guidelines (local and national) 
 
Recommendations for the identification of contacts/contact tracing 
 In case of an outbreak regulations on case control are necessary, including compulsory 
medical evaluation of identified close contacts. 
 
 Guidelines for risk communication on local and national level in order to avoid 
stigmatization of suspected cases.     
 
3. Hospital isolation of confirmed SARS contacts 
Close contacts diagnosed with SARS are referred to isolation wards if clinically indicated or if 
home isolation or isolation in a designated community facility cannot be achieved safely and 
effectively [1, 2, 3]. 
 
Possible Hazards 
• Confirmed SARS contacts refuse hospital isolation. 
• The risk of being infected at the SARS ward during a medical evaluation. 
 
Critical Control Points 
• Compulsory case isolation  
• Home isolation or isolation at a designated community facility 
• PPE and hygiene guidelines 
 
Recommendations for hospital isolation of confirmed SARS contacts: 
 Hospital isolation for very ill SARS patients 
 
 Isolation at home or at designated community facilities if safe and effective  
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4. Quarantine of asymptomatic contacts 
Close contacts are quarantined at home and at designated quarantine sites for 10-22 days after 
last exposure with a potential case. Quarantine may be voluntary (UK) or mandatory (Singapore) 
[1, 2, 3, 8, 9]. 
Possible Hazards 
• Home quarantined contacts do not comply with recommendations for home quarantine.  
• Perceived asymptomatic contact develop SARS symptoms during/after end home 
quarantine 
Critical Control Points 
• Sanction home quarantine of suspected SARS cases  e.g. by fines or enforcing 
quarantine regulations 
• Follow up interviews by health care officials during and after the home quarantine 
period   
 
Recommendations for the quarantine of asymptomatic contacts: 
 Persons in quarantine should sleep separately from others; they should wear a 
mask when near someone else and not share personal items. 
 
 Self monitoring of symptoms by home quarantined contacts, e.g. daily 
temperature check  
 
  
5. Services for quarantined/isolated persons 
Food and other essential supplies should be provided for home quarantined/ isolated persons as 
well as people isolated/quarantined at designated community facility [1, 8]. 
Possible Hazards 
• Service personnel attending home quarantined/isolated contacts might get infected by an 
unrecognized SARS case among the close contacts 
• Contacts suffer from psychological stress caused by quarantine. 
 
Critical Control Points 
• Standard infection control measures; PPE and hygiene guidelines  
• Follow up visits/contact by health care officials/hotlines 
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Recommendations on services provided to quarantined/isolated persons: 
 Provide guidelines for home visits by service personnel attending to the care and 
supplies of quarantined contacts. 
 
 Establish hotlines and “service corps” as a daily communication line for people in 
home quarantine/isolation or in designated facilities. 
 
6.  Measures to decrease social interaction 
Identification of public events like e.g. concerts, football matches and public facilities like e.g. 
schools and businesses that are at risk of spreading the infection.     
 
Possible Hazards   
• Risk of transmission of SARS between members of the community during mass 
gatherings 
• Risk of transmission of disease between the public in the public arena – like schools. 
 
Critical Control Points 
• Ban/restriction/reduction of mass gatherings  
• Closure of public facilities, like schools and businesses: Strategy to prevent/minimize the 
risk of SARS transmission in the community, and to minimize the public interaction to 
prevent casual transmission in the population 
• Educate the public in PPE and hygiene guidelines 
 
Recommendations for measures to decrease social interaction: 
 Provide guidelines for when, how and which gathering should be prohibited and 
decide possible sanctions  
 
 Provide guidelines concerning when, how and which institutions should be closed 
in case of a SARS outbreak, in order to prevent / mitigate transmission of SARS. 
 
 Conduct modeling analyses in order to have data on most effective intervention 
measures, considering the certain national situation (society structure and 
population density).   
 
 
Summary of recommendations for community containment measures: 
The main results of the HACCP analysis of community containment measures pointed to a need 
for structured case investigation and contact tracing procedures to ensure early case detection 
and disease control; guidelines for risk communication on local and national level to avoid 
public panic and distress; establishing hotlines and “service corps” for people in 
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quarantine/isolation at home or in designated facilities to prevent the psychological effects of 
isolation; developing guidelines for quarantine/isolation procedures and precautions at home and 
at designated community facilities for patients, relatives, neighbours as well as service providers; 
producing information campaigns or education programs about self monitoring procedures and 
finally; developing guidelines for social distancing in case of an outbreak.  
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Flowchart 7 
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Conclusion:  
The use of the HACCP methodology enables us to identify areas that need improvement to 
enhance preparedness and response capacities of SARS, based on previous experiences. It also 
helps us in keying out possible control points and developing recommendations to minimize the 
risk of spread of the disease. The method can be easily adapted and applied to evaluate the 
preparedness and response level of other similar infectious diseases. 
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Appendix 1: Table of results 
HACCP results for the command and control  
Hazards Critical control points Recommendations 
Support by international institutions 
• Published guidelines are not used for national 
preparedness 
• Guidelines are not adequate to be considered 
by nations 
• Nations do not make their pandemic 
preparedness activities public and thus do not 
participate on policy evaluation, which is 
necessary to identify current status of areas to 
be improved. 
• Nations do not participate on preparedness 
workshops, or do not conduct national 
preparedness workshops 
• Nations do not want to discuss their current 
preparedness activities with external experts. 
• Recommendations to improve national 
preparedness are not considered 
• Research activities (like European framework 
programs) require time to produce applicable 
recommendations. 
 
• Guidelines on national pandemic 
preparedness 
 
 
 
• Inventory of national preparedness 
activities 
 
 
 
• Support of national preparedness 
 
 
 
 
• Research on Pandemic infections 
 
• Overall Guidelines have to be written in a common manner, such that they can be 
adapted by all states and build an overall basis for national preparedness planning. 
 
• Inventory and the support of national preparedness have to be undertaken in a 
“diplomatic” way in order to avoid unmasking nation’s preparedness activities. 
Also the public health policy support has to be organised in a diplomatic manner, 
to ensure nation’s co-operation.  
 
• Research accomplished to improve disease response and preparedness activities 
have to be undertaken in a timely manner to assure a timely implementation of 
scientific findings 
 
Identify authorities and institutions responsible in disease response 
• Authorities in charge of decision making are not 
identified, which leads to an uncoordinated 
disease response and a delay in implementing 
control measures. 
• The public does not trust the national disease 
• Incorporate pandemic response in 
existing national public health 
structures for pandemic preparedness 
and response [7], as these systems 
have proved to be functional. 
• Use of existing national public health structures for pandemic preparedness and 
response, because these systems are proved already operative. Incorporate 
pandemic response in these structures. 
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management, because the response seems 
uncoordinated (e.g. due to unqualified 
spokesperson).  
• Individuals dedicated for certain response 
activities are not qualified. 
• The lack of scientific advise leads to a non-
“scientific based” outbreak management. 
• The PPP is written without expert advice and 
thus parts are inapplicable. 
• The lack of clearly defined command structure 
(who has to be informed and who is responsible 
to decide about what action has to be taken, etc) 
leads to a delay in response activities 
• National epidemiological outbreak investigation 
teams are not prepared for an epidemic; have 
insufficient capacity and equipment for their 
work.  
• No specific SARS facilities with dedicated 
isolation and triage wards are established. 
Common hospitals have to care for SARS 
patients which could lead to inappropriate 
treatment and lack of infection control 
standards. 
• An national reference laboratory, able to 
perform the needed laboratory-tests, is not 
available, which leads to a delay in specimen 
testing.  
• Arrangements with partner laboratories, to 
verify diagnoses (recommended by WHO [6]), 
are not contacted, which delays case 
confirmation. 
• The national disease control institution is not 
prepared for pandemic outbreak surveillance, 
with a possibly high number of cases, and 
institutions to assist a country are not identified. 
• National and regional spokespersons are not 
identified, which leads to inadequate public 
communication 
• Ensure that a staff pool to undertake 
community containment measures 
and to maintain essential public 
services is well trained and available 
for a possible epidemic. Alternative 
staff should be identified on demand 
in order to enhance the response 
capacity.  
• Health care facilities appropriate for 
the treatment of infectious cases 
have to be identified. They should 
have sufficient isolation capacity 
available and personal protective 
equipment (PPE) need to be 
stockpiled. 
• Arrangements with national 
laboratories and laboratories of the 
“Multi-centre Collaborative 
Network” [7] should be contacted in 
order to undertake SARS diagnostic 
procedures according to the WHO 
guidelines [11]. 
• National and regional outbreak 
investigation teams should be 
available to undertake research on 
the origin and progression of an 
epidemic.  
• Establish a Pandemic planning 
committee, to get expert advice on 
the outbreak management to ensure 
“scientific based” planning and 
response [7].  
• Arrange co-operations with 
neighbouring countries in order to 
get or offer support if being 
overwhelmed by a pandemic 
outbreak.  
 
 
• Make sure that a staff pool, to undertake community containment measures and to 
maintain essential public services, is available and well trained for a possible 
epidemic. Alternative staff should be identified on demand in order to enhance 
the response capacity.  
 
 
 
 
• Health care facilities appropriate for the treatment of infectious cases have to be 
identified. They should have sufficient isolation capacity available and personal 
protective equipment (PPE) need to be stockpiled. 
 
 
 
• Arrangements with national laboratories and laboratories of the “Multi-centre 
Collaborative Network” [8] should be contracted in order to undertake SARS 
diagnoses procedures according the WHO guidelines [11]. 
 
 
• National and regional outbreak investigation teams should be available to 
undertake research on the origin and progression of an epidemic.  
 
 
• Establish a Pandemic planning committee, to get expert advice on the outbreak 
management to ensure “scientific based” planning and response [7].  
 
 
 
• Arrange co-operations with neighbouring countries in order to get or offer support 
if being overwhelmed by a pandemic outbreak.  
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Develop national pandemic preparedness plans and guidelines for relevant response activities 
 
• Components of the PPP are not applicable and 
can not be implemented. 
 
• Guidelines for the treatment of SARS cases 
outside dedicated SARS wards are not in place. 
Large  amount of patients can not be treated 
adequately and in a safe manner 
 
• Legal issues to put containment measures into 
practice are not considered which leads to 
conflict with national law. 
 
• Ethical issues of outbreak management are not 
addressed, leading to a lack of public 
acceptance of outbreak management. 
 
• Communication to exchange information with 
international institutions and further countries is 
not organised. 
 
• Communication among different national 
hierarchical levels is not organised.  
 
• Communication to the public is not organised. 
 
• The role of media is not considered in the PPP. 
 
 
• Components of PPPs 
 
• Treatment in non dedicated SARS 
facilities 
 
• Legal issues 
 
• Ethical issues 
 
• Communication 
 
• Ensure that authorities on all policy levels are involved in pandemic planning and 
that they co-operate in applying the recommendations.  
 
• The founding of response activities should be considered in pandemic planning. 
 
• Write the PPP with relevant experts. Get advice from experts of various public 
health fields in order to ensure that different public health opinions are considered 
in the plan. 
 
• Establish guidelines on how to act if standard treatment situations (SARS ward) 
are not available.  
 
• Establish guidelines on how to act if capacities of services are overwhelmed. 
 
• Identify quick and effective communication methods among all relevant 
institutions, levels and the public. 
 
• Identify appropriate spokesperson(s) on national and regional level in order to 
maintain public’s trust.  
 
• Consider legal, ethical and financial issues in the PPP. 
 
Estimate impact of a pandemic on outbreak management, health care and other essential services (identify surge capacity) 
• Modelling analyses are lacking, inadequate or 
not updated; therefore a wrong assumption of 
pandemic impact on public health services is 
made 
• Estimate the impact of an epidemic 
• Clinics and Hospitals 
• Laboratory capacity  
• Community Containment Measures 
• Conduct national epidemic modelling analysis regularly to have updated data of 
the situation. Such analyses should be the basis to identify the outbreak impact on 
the health system in order to plan necessary response activities.  
 
SARSControl project/WP8/L Hjarnø, AM Syed, R Krumkamp, R Reintjes, AR Aro. 
 
 52 
• Clinics appropriate for the treatment of SARS 
patients are not identified in a sufficient 
number.  
• Ventilators or PPE are not stored to a necessary 
degree, which leads to a shortage in supply. 
• Laboratory for the diagnoses of SARS are not 
able to analyse a high number of cultures, which 
leads to a delay in testing procedures and case 
confirmation. 
• Implementing CCMs (like managing mass 
gatherings) requires a large number of trained 
staff. Such personnel need to be identified and 
trained ahead of an epidemic.  
• Financial resources are not secured, which lead 
to a delay in recruiting staff and the application 
of intervention measures during an outbreak 
• Disease surveillance in outbreak situations 
could be overwhelmed in: 
• Way of case reporting (e.g. by fax is not 
suitable to manage a large number of cases)  
• Data management programmes (not adequate to 
handle large datasets). 
 
(CCM) 
• Surveillance  
 
• Define alternative treatment options (like mobile triage facilities) in case SARS 
wards are overcrowded.  
 
• Arrange agreements with laboratories (neighbouring countries) if high number of 
samples need to be tested.  
 
• Update PPP regularly to address political and social changes. 
 
• Surveillance data should be computer-based, in order to ensure fast and easy 
analysis.  
 
• Legal and financial issues of outbreak response have to be planned in beforehand. 
Institutional pandemic preparedness planning 
• The plan does not include necessary 
components, which leads to a lack of needed 
guidelines. 
• Individuals in charge are not suitable to manage 
the tasks allocated to them.  
• Not all staff follows the plan, because they do 
not accept the guidelines. 
• No staff pool for outbreak response is available 
to address the need caused by an outbreak. 
 
• Identifying stakeholders 
• Components of the plan 
• Acceptance 
• Staff pool 
 
• Ensure that the all institutions involved in outbreak response accept the 
preparedness planning so that outbreak containment can be immediately 
applied if needed. 
 
• Identify reserve staff which could support the hospital during a pandemic 
 
• Guide the institutions in the pandemic planning to ensure well functioning 
plans. 
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HACCP results for the Preparedness and response planning in health care facilities component 
Hazards Critical control points Recommendations 
Surveillance and Triage 
• Unrecognized SARS patients might infect 
“healthy” patients/visitors/HCW during 
hospitalization or GP consultation.  
• Monitoring work insufficient and undetected 
cases can spread the disease   
 
• Special entrance ways/triage 
arrears/ward for patients with 
specific symptoms    
• Educating the GP/ physicians in 
correct case definition/diagnosis 
• Registration and monitoring of 
patients, health care workers and 
visitors with SARS-like symptoms 
(hospital logs) 
 
• Development of a preparedness and response plan for each Hospital/GP 
clinic/center.  
• Distribution of consultation guidelines and triage procedures in case of a suspected 
SARS patient.  
• Training of medical staff in use of PPE, hand hygiene, respiratory etiquette 
• Establish procedures within each HCF to monitor risk groups like staff, patients and 
visitors to enforce early detection of new cases of SARS.  
• Develop guidelines and train staff on triage screening of patients in case of an 
SARS outbreak in order to use limited resources appropriately. 
Clinical evaluation of symptomatic persons 
• The patient is not diagnosed correctly and is not 
transferred to an isolation ward 
• No appropriate diagnostic tests are available, 
which leads to late case identification or 
misdiagnoses 
• Establish procedures within each 
HCF to ensure access to  relevant 
information (diagnoses, treatment, 
research)  
 
• Establish procedures within each HCF and GP/physicians clinic to ensure correct 
and updated  case definition/diagnosis 
• Identify SARS hospitals, with appropriate diagnostic supplies. 
Infection Control and Respiratory Hygiene 
• Transmission from HC personnel working on 
different wards or in different hospital settings  
• PPEs are not stockpiled and the resources are 
limited 
 
• Infection control measures (Use of 
PPE, hand hygiene, respiratory 
etiquette ) 
• Designate specific SARS hospitals 
for treatment in case of an outbreak, 
with appropriate diagnostic supplies 
• Provide clear guidelines about how to apply infection control measures, including 
proper use of PPE (masks or respirators, gloves, gowns and eye protection). 
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Patient isolation wards 
• Transfer of SARS patients from one ward to 
another might increases the likelihood of 
infection of other patients and HCW 
• Insufficient isolation wards causing infection of 
fellow patients and HCW’ 
 
• Minimize risk of infection during 
transport of SARS patients; Infection 
control measures (Use of PPE, hand 
hygiene, respiratory etiquette ) 
• Isolation units at designated SARS 
hospitals 
 
• Identify specific SARS wards and paths separated from other hospital traffic to 
minimize the risk of transmission to patients, visitors, and staff. 
• Develop guidelines for the isolation procedures and placement concerning: Triage 
wards, SARS evaluation clinics (fever clinics) and case diagnosis 
• Development of strategies at HCFs to quickly implement appropriate isolation 
procedures, separating the suspected cases from the other patients. 
Engineering and Environment Control 
• Spread of infection within the healthcare facility 
 
• SARS treatment units 
 
• Improve the capacity of the facility to isolate SARS patients in designated Infection 
Control Units (IFU).  
• Install infection isolation rooms (AIIRs) 
• Develop guidelines about how an AIIRs will be modified if required 
Exposure Reporting and Evaluation 
• Late identification of cases in the HCF (which 
can lead to possible disease transmission) 
 
• Exposure report 
 
• Healthcare facilities should develop an exposure reporting procedure of all 
suspected and confirmed SARS cases  
 
• Develop strategies for regularly communication with the public health department 
in order to share information about possible case contacts 
Health care personnel 
• Lack of extra staff to support the hospital in a 
crises situation 
 
• Staff recruitment   
 
• Develop staff recruitment plans (e.g. retired staff) to ensure the estimated need of 
staff required to manage a SARS outbreak. 
• Ensure regularly training in good infection control practices e.g. use of PPE, hand 
hygiene and respiratory etiquette. 
 
Hospital access control 
• Unrecognized SARS patients might infect 
“healthy” patients/visitors/HCW during 
hospitalization/consultation 
 
• Access control – symptom screening 
 
• HCF should develop criteria and plans for limiting access to the healthcare facility 
 
• Develop guidelines for visitors and supplementary staff at the designated SARS 
HCF to self monitor for SARS symptoms and information on health advice seeking. 
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Supplies and equipment 
• Insufficient amount of PPE is stockpiled 
according to estimated need.   
 
• Develop strategies to estimate the 
need of extra equipment and services 
in case of an outbreak.   
 
• The HCF should determine the availability of supplies and equipment and maintain 
an appropriate stock of PPE. 
 
• Public health departments should monitor the availability of PPEs. In crisis situation 
allocation of material could be organised using these data.  
 
• Develop specific agreements with providers of essential services to ensure delivery 
during an outbreak.    
Communication and case reporting 
• Incorrect information is published in the media 
causing panic and distress in the community 
 
• Appoint a responsible 
communication coordinator in 
charge of hospital statements, to 
ensure reliability. 
•  The HCF should develop case reports and communication strategies  
• A hospital spokesperson should be identified and trained in risk communication 
 
HACCP results for the Surveillance and Laboratory diagnostics component 
Hazards Critical control points Recommendations 
GP consultation & Hospitalisation 
• The GP does not consider SARS in the 
diagnosis and therefore no laboratory test is 
carried out. 
• The GP misdiagnoses a case and request a 
laboratory test for respiratory diseases unlikely 
to be SARS resulting in the decrease of 
laboratory capacity and causing unnecessary 
utilization of test material and expense. 
• Possible SARS cases are not reported to the 
local public health office leading to further 
potential cases. 
 
• First diagnoses 
• Report of possible SARS cases 
 
• Provide clear guidelines to the public on how to behave in case of symptom onset 
• Ensure that GPs use updated case definitions for diagnosis of potential cases to be 
considered of laboratory testing/Ways to inform GPs of updated case definitions 
should be put in place.   
 
• Provide guidance for GPs and HCFs for their work during the pandemic period, to 
assist the handling of possible cases. 
 
• During pandemic spread, atypical pneumonia cases should be reported to the local 
public health office as they could be possibly infected with SARS. 
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Taking specimen samples and shipment of specimen culture 
• HCW could become infected by handling 
specimens 
• Samples can not be tested as they were taken in 
an inappropriate manner.   
• The specimen culture is not shipped in a 
appropriate way and contaminated material is 
discharged  
• Modes of transport used are time consuming 
hence extending the time for case confirmation. 
• Sample taking  
• Sample shipment 
 
• HCWs that have contact with possible SARS cases, or with infected material, need 
(i) strict guidelines for the handing of specimens, (ii) appropriate PPE’s and (iii) 
need to be well trained and educated to handling contaminated material. 
 
• Guidelines and appropriate material/equipment for the shipment of samples have to 
be available (13) 
 
Laboratory Testing 
• Due to lack of safety standards laboratory staff 
could become infected. This especially matters 
during the non-endemic period because staff is 
unaware of a possible threat of an infectious 
disease like SARS. 
 
• The reference laboratory has less capacity and is 
overwhelmed by the ordered sample tests and 
no alternative laboratory is identified 
 
• The tests are done incorrectly, which has an 
impact on the sensitivity and specificity of 
results.  
 
• Specimens are handled in an unsafe manner and 
lab staff may become infected. 
• Local laboratory 
• National reference lab 
• Testing procedure 
 
• Recommend high safety standards for the diagnoses of possible infective specimens 
generally.  
 
• Consider laboratories for the diagnoses of SARS and designate alternative 
laboratory for an outbreak situation. Make sure that safety recommendations are 
considered in the diagnosing labs and for the shipment of specimens.  
 
• Use only biosafety 3 laboratory for the analyses of possible SARS specimens 
Report preliminary test result 
• Cases are reported late or incomplete. These 
data will be late or not available for the disease 
surveillance.  
• Cases are reported late to WHO / ECDC. These 
data will be late or not available for 
international disease surveillance 
• Reporting preliminary positive cases 
to local / national public health 
office 
• Report preliminary cases to WHO / 
ECDC 
 
• Make sure that reporting algorithms are available and followed. Cases need to be 
reported as soon as possible to all relevant institutions to assure a complete and 
actual picture of the current disease situation. This is relevant for each level, 
regional, national and international 
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Verification of positive results 
• Due to lack of safety standards laboratory staff 
could become infected. This especially matters 
during the non-endemic period because staff is 
unaware of a possible threat of an infectious 
disease like SARS. 
 
• The reference laboratory have less capacity and 
is overwhelmed by the ordered sample tests and 
no alternative laboratory is identified 
 
• The tests are done incorrectly, which has an 
impact on the sensitivity and specificity of 
results.  
 
• Specimens are handled in an unsafe manner and 
laboratory staff may become infected. 
 
• Cases are reported late or are incomplete. These 
data will be late or not available for the disease 
surveillance.  
• Cases are reported late to WHO / ECDC. These 
data will be late or not available for 
international disease surveillance 
• Sample shipment 
• Laboratory diagnostics  
• Result report 
 
• A safety shipment of the specimens is needed to avoid contamination.  
 
• Correct interpretation of laboratory findings as defined by WHO is needed to secure a 
high sensitivity and specificity (9). Current scientific evidence in laboratory 
diagnostics has to be applied for accurate results.  
 
• As described in point 3 and 4, quick shipment, diagnoses and a timely dissemination 
of results are essential for timely disease surveillance. 
 
Data transfer and management 
• Data reporting procedures are too complicate 
which influences reporting speed and 
completeness of data [16].  
• Labs / GPs / Hospitals report cases late, thus 
surveillance data is not up-to-date. 
 
• Used computer programs are not appropriate to 
work with huge datasets (like in case of a 
pandemic), thus analysis of extensive outbreaks 
overwhelms data management capacity. 
• Secondary case data, e.g. on case contacts are 
• Data reporting: Laboratory/G/ 
Hospital 
• Data collection and analyses 
• Data report: local / regional public 
health office 
• Data report: to ECDC and WHO 
• Have reporting standards available for SARS or SARS-like diseases, which is 
applicable for each laboratory. 
• During endemic spread apply active data collection. 
• Use easy data management between the national public health offices (computer 
based). 
• Generally, use data management programs that are appropriate to manage huge 
datasets. 
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collected inappropriately and do not provide the 
necessary information.  
• Datasets can not be matched.  
• Dataset are inappropriate for the surveillance of 
SARS cases.  
• Computer programs are not appropriate to 
handle big datasets 
• Data reporting among the public health offices 
on different levels is organised bureaucratically 
which leads to a delay in data exchange. Also 
loss of data could be a caused due to complex 
data handling. 
• No legal basis to report data to WHO or ECDC 
exists, thus data are not available for 
international surveillance. 
• Data exchange is organised bureaucratically 
which leads to a delay. 
Dissemination of results 
• Results are not forwarded to the relevant 
authorities, thus relevant institutions are not 
aware about the extent of the outbreak. 
• Forward results to public health 
authorities 
 
• Communication ways clearly structured and applicable in a quick manner in order 
to disseminate surveillance data fast to the relevant authorities. 
 
HACCP results for community containment  
Hazards Critical control points Recommendations 
Interview of confirmed/suspected SARS case 
• Not all close contacts can be identified and  
they might develop symptoms in the 
community with a chance of spreading the 
disease 
 
• Case does not give out information/remember 
• As part of the epidemiological 
investigation: interview family and 
relatives of the case using structured 
questionnaires  
 
• Review of patient or visitor logs from 
• Guidelines for conducting structured interviews with confirmed and suspected 
SARS cases – questions should be framed to obtain information on: 
• Recent travel history (within the last 10 days) to suspected or confirmed source 
areas/countries  
• Close contact with travel history to suspected or confirmed source 
areas/countries. 
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all the contact(s) he/she has had in the last 10 
days, especially when suffering from strong 
disease symptoms 
the hospital    
 
 
• Health status of close contacts for symptoms suggestive to SARS.  
• Employment in an occupation with an increased risk for SARS-CoV exposure, 
including e.g. exposed health care worker or laboratory staff. 
• Interview of family members and close relatives in order to confirm the 
information provided by the cases. 
• Review of patient journal, visitor log and employee schedules in institutions 
where SARS transmission occurs. 
Identify contacts/Contact Tracing 
• Identified contacts  refuse to collaborate    
• The risk of being infected with SARS as an 
identified contacts show symptoms and is 
admitted to designated  SARS hospital for 
medical evaluation  
• Stigmatization of identified close contacts 
• Compulsory medical evaluation of 
identified close contacts 
• PPE and Hygiene guidelines 
• Risk communication guidelines (local 
and national) 
 
• In case of an outbreak regulations on case control are necessary, including 
compulsory medical evaluation of identified close contacts. 
• Guidelines for risk communication on local and national level in order to avoid 
stigmatization of suspected cases.     
 
Hospital isolation of confirmed SARS contacts 
•  
• Confirmed SARS contact refuse hospital 
isolation. 
• The risk of being infected at the SARS ward 
during a medical evaluation. 
 
• Compulsory case isolation  
• Home isolation or isolation at a 
designated community facility 
• PPE and Hygiene guidelines 
 
• Hospital isolation for very ill SARS patients 
 
• Isolation at home or at designated community facilities if safe and effective  
 
Quarantine of asymptomatic contacts 
• Home quarantined contacts do not comply with 
recommendations for home quarantine.  
• Perceived asymptomatic contact develops 
SARS symptoms during/after end home 
quarantine 
 
• Sanction home quarantine of 
suspected SARS cases  e.g. by fines or  
enforcing quarantine regulations 
• Follow up interviews by health care 
officials during and after the home 
quarantine period   
• Persons in quarantine should sleep separately from others; they should wear a 
mask when near someone else and not share personal items. 
• Self monitoring of symptoms by home quarantined contacts, e.g. daily 
temperature check  
 
Services for quarantined/isolated persons 
• Service personnel attending home 
quarantined/isolated contacts might get infected 
by an unrecognized SARS case among the 
close contacts 
• Contacts suffer from psychological stress 
• Standard infection control measures; 
PPE and hygiene guidelines  
 
• Follow up visits/contact by Health 
care officials/Hotlines 
• Provide guidelines for home visits by service personnel attending to the care 
and supplies of quarantined contacts. 
 
• Establish hotlines and “service corps” as a daily communication line for people 
in home quarantine/isolation or designated facilities 
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caused by quarantine. 
 
Measures to decrease social interaction 
• Risk of transmission of SARS between 
members of the community during mass 
gatherings 
• Risk of transmission of disease between the 
public in the public arena – like schools. 
 
• Ban/restriction/reduction of mass 
gatherings  
• Closure of public facilities, like 
schools and businesses: Strategy to 
prevent/minimize the risk of SARS 
transmission in the community, and to 
minimize the public interaction to 
prevent casual transmission in the 
population 
• Educate the public in PPE and 
Hygiene guidelines. 
• Provide guidelines for when, how and which gathering should be prohibited 
and decide possible sanctions  
 
• Provide guidelines concerning when, how and which institutions should be 
closed in case of a SARS outbreak, in order to prevent / mitigate transmission 
of SARS. 
• Conduct modeling analyses in order to have data on most effective intervention 
measures, considering the certain national situation (society structure and 
population density).  
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
